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PROTECTING SHAREHOLDERS FROM
THEMSELVES: HOW THE UNITED
KINGDOM’S 2011 TAKEOVER CODE
AMENDMENTS HIT THEIR MARK
Matthew Peetz
INTRODUCTION
American food conglomerate Kraft Foods’ four-month-long,
hostile-turned-friendly takeover of British icon Cadbury,1 met with
outcries from unions, politicians, and the general public.2 The uproar
led to major changes in the United Kingdom’s City Code on


J.D. Candidate, 2013, Dickinson School of Law, Pennsylvania State
University. I would like to thank the JLIA editorial board from the graduating
classes of 2012, 2013, and 2014 for all of their help in the writing, revising, and
editing processes. I would like to thank Professor Sam Thompson for the
inspiration for this piece. I would like to thank Dean Amy Gaudion for making me
a better a legal writer and editor. And finally, I would like to thank my Grandfather,
my Mom & Dad, and Colleen Kasprzak for their continued love and support
throughout law school and particularly through the long nights associated with
writing for a journal.
1 See TIMELINE-Kraft Agrees to Cadbury Deal After 4-month Fight,
REUTERS, Jan. 19, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/19/cadbury-kraftidUSLDE60E0XI20100119 [hereinafter TIMELINE).
2 See David Jones & Brad Dorfman, Kraft Snares Cadbury for $19.6 Billion,
REUTERS, Jan. 19, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/19/us-cadburyidUSTRE60H1N020100119. Much of the concern among the public was over two
things: losing Cadbury, a uniquely British company, to a faceless giant of a
company; and over the potential loss of jobs, which occurs after almost any merger
when the two newly merged companies start consolidating operations and work
forces.
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Takeovers and Mergers (“Takeover Code”).3 Within eighteen
months of the takeover, The Code Committee (“The Code
Committee” or “The Committee”) of The Panel on Takeovers and
Mergers (“the Takeover Panel” or “The Panel”) amended the
Takeover Code. The Committee’s change corrected the perceived
imbalance of power in favor of bidders in a takeover attempt.4 It is
unclear, however, whether this inequity was as threatening as the
public outcry made it seem.5 Rather, The Code Committee may have
succumbed to political pressures by creating amendments that
protect target companies at the expense of target company
shareholders.6 Moreover, some large law firms hypothesized that the
new Code amendments would deter some potential bidders from
ever pursuing a target company, thereby chilling the mergers and
acquisitions (“M&A”) market and reducing potential sale proceeds to
target shareholders.7 On the other hand, “short-term” investors can
unduly influence hostile bids.8
Therefore, in practice, the
See generally THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, THE CITY
CODE
ON
TAKEOVERS
AND
MERGERS
(10th
ed.
2011),
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/code.pdf
[hereinafter Takeover Code].
4 THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, REVIEW OF CERTAIN
ASPECTS OF THE REGULATION OF TAKEOVER BIDS, 2010, Consultation Paper
Issued by The Code Committee of The Panel PCP 2010/2, 4,
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2008/11/PCP201002.p
df [hereinafter Consultation Paper].
5 See generally Michael R. Patrone, Sour Chocolate? Cadbury/Kraft and the
2011 Proposed Amendments to the U.K. Takeover Code – A Call for Further Research, 8
BYU INT’L L. MGMT. R. 63, 66 (2011),
http://www.law2.byu.edu/ilmr/articles/winter_2011/BYU_ILMR_winter_2011_4
_Chocolate.pdf. See also note 99.
6 See Patrone, supra note 5, at 65-66; Takeover Code, Introduction, ¶ 2(a) at
A1 (stating that the shareholders are the primary constituents whom The Code
seeks to protect).
7 See, e.g., Corporate Legal Alert, Mayer Brown, Takeover Code Changes
Published – Is This a New Era for UK Takeovers? (July 2011)
http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/Takeover-Code-changes-published—is-this-a-new-era-for-UK-takeovers-07-21-2011/; Client Briefing, Clifford Chance,
Impact
of
UK
Takeover
Code
Reform,
10
(Sept.
15,
2011)
http://www.cliffordchance.com/publicationviews/publications/2011/09/impact_
of_uk_takeovercodereform.html.
8 See infra Part III.A. See also Consultation Paper, supra note 4, at 4
(describing “short-term” investors as those shareholders who become interested in
3
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shareholders of the target company may not be protected to the
extent The Code originally envisioned. This “short-term” investor
problem was the primary problem the amendments intended to fix.9
Either way the amendments will likely substantially impact how a
takeover bid will operate in the United Kingdom going forward.
This comment argues that The Code amendments will
protect target company shareholders beyond the pre-amendment
regime, without over-regulating and potentially harming other aspects
of takeover practice. Had The Code Committee gone further by fully
implementing10 the proposed idea of exempting “short-term”
investors from voting on transactions,11 the M&A market generally,
and target shareholders specifically, would have been harmed in
contravention of the principles12 of the Takeover Code. Although
the Takeover Panel appeared to react due to the public dismay, the
amendments will serve the established shareholders of publically
traded United Kingdom companies, and therefore strengthen the
protections envisioned under the original spirit of The Code.13
Part I of this comment will briefly explore the history of the
Kraft-Cadbury takeover and the resulting fervor surrounding the
deal.14 Part II will discuss the traditional functions of the Takeover
Panel and the Takeover Code.15 Part III will explain the four major
the shares of the target company only after a public announcement of a possible
offer); see also Jean Eaglesham & Lina Saigol, Mandelson Urges Radical Takeover Reform,
FIN. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5491ca8a-2587-11df9bd3-00144feab49a.html#ixzz1Y8uy6kxO.
9 See Steven M. Davidoff, British Takeover Rules May Mean Quicker Pace but
Fewer Bids, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 19, 2011,
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/09/19/new-british-rules-will-speed-up-thepace-of-takeovers/.
10 This comment will suggest, infra Part IV, that a measured, limited
application of this proposed amendment may increase shareholder protection in
the future.
11 Consultation Paper, supra note 4, at 20.
12 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Introduction, Gen. Principles 1-6, at B1;
The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, Explanatory Paper: Implementation of the
European Directive on Takeover Bids, 2005/10, apps. 1-2 at 24-26.
13 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Introduction, Gen. Principles 1-6, at B1.
14 See infra Part I.A.
15 See infra Part I.B.
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changes to the Takeover Code and will explore the concerns with,
and the reasoning behind, each amendment by examining the
consulting and explanatory papers about The Code amendments
issued by the Takeover Panel.16 Part IV will first look to economic
studies of shareholder value in takeovers17 and then explore the
effects of “short-term” investors18 on takeover attempts.19 Finally,
this comment will conclude that the new amendments will mitigate
those “short-term” investor detrimental effects and actually protect
shareholders as the Takeover Code had always intended.
I. HISTORY & BACKGROUND
A. The Kraft-Cadbury Deal, the Resulting Fervor, and Swift
Action by the Takeover Panel
It took Kraft Foods four hard-fought months to reach a deal
with the shareholders of Cadbury.20 After a series of offers and
rejections, and then over two months of Cadbury posting increasing
financial projections and share prices, Kraft increased its bid to £11.9
billion ($19.55 billion U.S.), which the Cadbury board accepted on
January 19, 2010.21 The Cadbury shareholders accepted Kraft’s
tender offer22 on February 2, 2010, with over seventy percent of the
See infra Parts II.A-D.
See infra Part III.A.
18 Merger arbitrageurs, discussed infra Part III.B, are the most prevalent
type of “short-term” investors in M&A practices and the type with which this
comment will concern itself.
19 See infra Part III.B.
20 See TIMELINE, supra note 1.
21 See Graeme Wearden, Timeline: Cadbury’s Fight Against Kraft, THE
GUARDIAN, Jan. 19, 2010,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/jan/19/cadbury-kraft-takeovertimeline. Kraft made a public indicative offer on September 7, 2009, for £10.2
billion (approximately $16.3 billion U.S.), Kraft submitted its firm hostile bid
directly to the Cadbury shareholders on November 9, 2009, on the same terms it
originally proposed to the Cadbury board. This offer was quickly rejected by the
shareholders. See id.
22 For an explanation of a tender offer see Tender Offer, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’, http://www.sec.gov/answers/tender.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2012) (“A
tender offer is a broad solicitation by a company or a third party to purchase a
substantial percentage of a company’s . . . registered equity shares or units for a
16
17
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shareholders tendering their shares.23 During this four-month
process, the composition of the Cadbury shareholders changed
drastically.24 By the time the shareholders tendered their shares,
“short-term” investors such as hedge funds had increased their share
in Cadbury from five percent to about thirty-one percent of the
company.25
Throughout the takeover battle unions and politicians in the
United Kingdom voiced strong opposition to Kraft swallowing
Cadbury.26
United Kingdom Business Secretary Lord Peter
Mandelson, for example, was against the takeover as early as
September 25, 2009.27 After the transaction was consummated,
Mandelson urged substantial reform of the United Kingdom takeover
regime.28 Unions in the United Kingdom also argued against the
Cadbury takeover due to the fear of large-scale job cuts.29
Compounding the fears and flaring political tempers, the Royal Bank
of Scotland, at the time an eighty-four percent taxpayer-owned bank,
agreed to loan Kraft £630 million (approximately $1.03 billion U.S.)
to finance the takeover after the bank had been bailed out by the

limited period of time. The offer is at a fixed price, usually at a premium over the
current market price, and is customarily contingent on shareholders tendering a
fixed number of their shares or units”).
23 David Jones & Brad Dorfman, Cadbury Shareholders Approve Kraft
Takeover, REUTERS, Feb. 2, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/02/02/uscadbury-kraft-idUSTRE61124D20100202.
24 See Foreign Takeovers in Britain: Small Island for Sale, ECONOMIST, May 25,
2010, http://www.economist.com/node/15769586.
25 Id.
26 See infra text accompanying notes 27-30.
27 David Teather, Mandelson Admits Foreign Ownership of Firms Disadvantages
UK, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 25, 2009,
http://www.guardian.com.uk/business/2009/sep/25/mandelson-british-industryunions.
28 See Eaglesham & Saigol, supra note 8.
29 See Debt-Heavy Kraft Could Put 30,000 Cadbury Jobs at Risk, Warns Unite,
UNITE THE UNION, Jan. 13, 2010,
http://archive.unitetheunion.org/news__events/archived_news_releases/2010_arc
hived_press_releases/debt-heavy_kraft_could_put_3-1.aspx .
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government.30 Surely the Takeover Panel was acutely aware of the
mounting political pressure throughout the United Kingdom.
In contrast to the dragged out takeover battle that ensued
between Kraft and Cadbury, it took less than a year and a half for
The Code Committee of the Takeover Panel to consider, propose,
and adopt amendments to the United Kingdom’s Takeover Code.31
In fact, a mere five weeks after the Kraft and Cadbury deal was
completed, The Code Committee announced its intention to solicit
input from the United Kingdom business community to review
specific aspects of the Takeover Code.32 The Committee cited the
Kraft takeover of Cadbury and the public reaction to the deal as the
impetus for its action.33 After this consultation period expired,34 The
Code Committee reviewed responses from numerous respondents.
The Committee then roughly outlined amendments it felt compelled
to undertake in an October 21, 2010, report.35 By March 2011, The
Committee had proposed amendments to the Takeover Code,36
which it adopted with little change in late July 2011.37 These
amendments took effect September 19, 2011.38

30 Clegg Attacks Brown Over RBS Funding for Cadbury Bid, BBC, Jan. 20,
2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/8470776.stm.
31 The Code Committee officially announced and adopted the
amendments in July 2011, but it was another two months before the amendments
came into effect on Sept. 19, 2011.
32 Consultation Paper, supra note 4, at 1.
33 Id.
34 The consultation period ran from June 1, 2010 to July 27, 2010.
35 THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS CODE COMMITTEE,
REVIEW OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE REGULATION OF TAKEOVER BIDS, PCP
2010/2,
1–2,
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2008/11/2010-22.pdf [hereinafter Panel Report].
36 THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS CODE COMMITTEE,
REVIEW OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE REGULATION OF TAKEOVER BIDS:
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE TAKEOVER CODE, PCP 2011/1,
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2008/11/PCP201101.pdf [hereinafter Proposed Amendments].
37 See THE CODE COMMITTEE OF THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND
MERGERS, 2011, AMENDMENTS FOLLOWING THE CODE COMMITTEE’S REVIEW OF
THE
REGULATION OF TAKEOVER BIDS, Instrument 2011/2, 1,
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B. The Operation of the Takeover Code and the Takeover Panel
The Takeover Panel was originally created in 1968 to oversee
takeover regulation in the United Kingdom.39 The Takeover Panel is
charged with issuing and administering the Takeover Code.40 The
United Kingdom Companies Act of 2006 codified and broadened the
rule-making powers of the Takeover Panel.41 Interestingly, when The
Code Committee first started soliciting input for the recent
amendments to The Code, the introduction paragraph of the
Takeover Code stated that its purpose was to ensure the fair
treatment of shareholders generally.42 However, when The Code
Committee published its Consultation Paper that began the initial
solicitations of input, the introduction had changed. The Committee
specifically wrote that The Code is designed principally to ensure that
shareholders in an offeree43 company . . . are treated fairly.”44 As
such, the Consultation Paper may have been the first indication that
political pressures were forcing The Panel to consider strengthening
target company shareholder protection.45
The Takeover Panel and the Takeover Code are not
concerned with the financial and commercial merits of takeovers. 46
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/Instrument2011-2.pdf [hereinafter Amendment Instrument].
38 Id.
39 Consultation Paper, supra note 4, at 1-2. The Takeover Panel governs
publically listed companies on the U.K. stock exchanges that have their registered
offices in the U.K. See Takeover Code, supra note 3, Introduction, ¶ 3(a) at A3.
40 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Introduction, ¶ 1 at A1.
41 Companies Act 2006, (c. 46), pt. 28 ch. 1.
42 See Amendment Instrument, supra note 37, at app. 1. (amending Introduction
¶ 2(a) from “The Code is designed principally to ensure that shareholders are
treated fairly . . .” to “. . . to ensure that shareholders in an offeree company are treated
fairly . . .”).
43 The Takeover Panel uses the terms “Offeree” and “Offeror” to
designate targets and acquirers. This comment will typically use the American
designations of “target” and “acquirer” or “bidder,” but will also use the formal
British terms of The Panel at times, especially when quoting or directly referring to
the Takeover Code or papers from The Panel.
44 Consultation Paper, supra note 4, at 2.
45 See generally Davidoff, supra note 9.
46 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Introduction ¶ 2(a) at A1; Consultation Paper at
2, 5.
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The Panel has never taken a view on the advantages or disadvantages
of takeovers to the companies participating in them.47 Instead, The
Panel and The Code exist to establish a framework to regulate the
conduct of companies involved in a particular transaction.48 The final
decision on the merits of an offer, however, is left to the
shareholders.49
In light of these principles, a central pillar of the Takeover
Code, and an excellent example of its purpose of ensuring fair
treatment of shareholders, is the Board Neutrality Rule.50 The Board
Neutrality Rule prevents the board of directors of a target company
from taking any action that may frustrate or deny the shareholders
the opportunity to decide on the merits of an offer themselves. 51
This is in stark contrast to the defensive tactics, such as poison pills, 52
that Delaware courts have long endorsed.53 As seen in the Cadbury
takeover, the best defense a target board can legally employ is to ask
the shareholders to vote against the bid.54 Cadbury’s board, for
example, could only show improved financial data in an attempt to
convince its shareholders that their long-term prospects of remaining
shareholders of Cadbury were better than their short-term prospects
(i.e. selling their shares to “short-term” investors or Kraft).55
Alternatively, Cadbury’s board could attempt to increase the fair

Consultation Paper, supra note 4, at 5.
Takeover Code, supra note 3, Introduction ¶ 2(a) at A1.
49 See Takeover Code, supra note 3, Introduction ¶ 2(a) at A1-A2.
50 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 21.1(a) at I13 (applying during the
course of an offer or when an offer is reasonably believed to be imminent).
51 Id.
52 SAMUEL S. THOMPSON, JR., BUSINESS PLANNING FOR MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS: CORPORATE, SECURITIES, TAX, ANTITRUST, INTERNATIONAL, AND
RELATED ASPECTS 155-56 (3d ed. 2008) (“The basic objectives of the [poison pill]
are to deter abusive takeover tactics by making them unacceptably expensive to the
raider [i.e. a hostile bidder] and to encourage prospective acquirers to negotiate
with the board of directors of the target rather than to attempt a hostile takeover.”).
53 See e.g., Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del.
1985).
54 See Wearden, supra note 21.
55 See Id.
47
48
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value of Cadbury’s shares—by making the company more
profitable—beyond what Kraft would be willing to pay.56
The Takeover Code presumes it is protecting shareholders
from board entrenchment57 by requiring neutrality of the board of
directors of target companies.58 Nevertheless, after receiving
numerous responses to its Consultation Paper, The Code Committee
concluded that hostile bidders had gained a tactical advantage over
targets because of “short-term” investors.59 The irony of dissuading
board defensive maneuvers, only to have “short-term” investors
provide the shareholder support that a bidder may need to complete
their hostile takeover, seems to have been a tipping point for The
Panel. In response, The Panel enacted several major amendments,
discussed below, to help tilt the balance of power back to a more
reasonable level for the target company shareholders.60
II. THE 2011 AMENDMENTS TO THE TAKEOVER CODE
To restore the level of protection originally afforded to target
company shareholders, The Code Committee sought to correct some
perceived disadvantages to those shareholders that had developed in
the system.61 The first problem that The Committee addressed was
the problem of the “virtual bid.”62 The “virtual bid” is a term of art
given to the time period after an announcement of a potential bid has
been made, but before a firm offer is made.63 This time period has
many effects. Significantly, it can lead to a change in the composition
of the shareholders when some shareholders sell to merger
arbitrageurs64 (i.e. “short-term” investors).65 Other problems The
See Id.
For an explanation of board entrenchment see infra Part III.A.
58 See Takeover Code, supra note 3, Note 5 on Rule 21.1 at I15.
59 Panel Report, supra note 35, at 3; see also supra note 8.
60 See infra Part I.
61 See generally Consultation Paper, supra note 4.
62 Panel Report, supra note 35, at 4.
63 See id. (explaining that the offer period is the period after there is public
knowledge of the potential bid. This can arise from an official announcement or if
information is accidently leaked).
64 Id.
65 See supra text accompanying notes 8, 24-25.
56
57

417

2013

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

2:2

Code Committee identified include: the acquiring company
effectively having the ability to negotiate directly with the target
shareholders and bypass the board without ever having to make a
firm offer;66 the bidding company obtaining the protections of the
Board Neutrality Rule against the target board simply by announcing
their intent to make an offer;67 a target’s board of directors being
reluctant to ask The Panel for a “Put Up or Shut Up”68 deadline for
the fear of appearing self-serving;69 and, the inclusion of inducement
fees (i.e. break fees70) becoming standard practice in many recent
deals possibly precluding competing offers.71 The Code Committee
attempts to address all of these problems through the amendments,
which will account for the following four major changes to the
operation of the United Kingdom’s Takeover Code.
A. The Announcing All Bidders Requirement
The 2011 Amendments to the Takeover Code will affect how
bidding companies approach target companies.72 The new
Announcing All Bidders requirement, operating in concert with the
mandatory “Put Up or Shut Up” deadline,73 will likely have the
greatest impact on the approach. Rule 2.4(a) of the Takeover Code
has been completely rewritten to require a target company to identify
any potential bidder with which the target has been in negotiations74
as soon as an offer period commences.75 Furthermore, Rule 2.2 now
Panel Report, supra note 35, at 4.
Id.
68 See generally Put Up or Shut Up, FIN. TIMES LEXICON, (Feb. 02, 2012,
3:09 PM) http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=put-up-or-shut-up (“The ‘put up or
shut up’ Takeover Panel rule is designed to stop predators besieging companies for
an indefinite period of time. It requires a potential bidder either to make an offer to
shareholders or walk away for a period of six months”).
69 Panel Report, supra note 35, at 4-5.
70 See Break Fee infra note 111.
71 Panel Report, supra note 35, at 5.
72 See Client Briefing, Clifford Chance, supra note 7, at 16.
73 Infra Part II.B.
74 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 2.4(a) at D5; Amendment Instrument,
supra note 37, at app. 8.
75 See Amendment Instrument, supra note 37, at app. 8; see also id. at app. 3
(“An offer period will commence when the first announcement is made of an offer
or possible offer for a company”).
66
67
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requires that the target company make an announcement in any of
three situations: first, when the board of the target company receives
notification of a firm intention to make an offer;76 second, when
following an approach from, or on behalf of, a bidding company the
target company becomes the subject of rumors, speculation or if
there is an untoward movement in the target company’s share price;77
or third, when a potential bidder has considered an offer but has not
approached the board of the target company yet, and the target
becomes the subject of rumor or speculation, or there is an untoward
movement in the target company’s share price and there are
reasonable grounds to conclude that the bidder’s potential actions
have led to the situation.78 In other words, when it is known or
rumored that a potential bid may affect securities’ prices, the target
company is required to make a public announcement of all known
potential bidders. This amendment will likely heighten the secrecy
with which bidding companies will plan their approach because the
mandatory “Put Up or Shut Up” deadline amendments, discussed
below, will tie in with this mandatory identification of the All
Potential Bidders Amendment.79
B. The Mandatory Twenty-Eight Day “Put Up or Shut Up”
Deadline
Amended rules to the Takeover Code 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8
together govern the function of the colloquially dubbed “Put Up or
Shut Up” deadline.80 Rule 2.6(a) expressly grants only a limited
twenty-eight day window from when a potential bidder is first

Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 2.2 at D2-D5; Amendment Instrument,
supra note 37, at app. 5-6.
77 Takeover Code, supra note3, Rule 2.2 at D2-D5; Amendment Instrument,
supra note 37, at app. 5-6.
78 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 2.2 at D2-D5; Amendment Instrument,
supra note 37, at app. 5-6.
79 See Client Briefing, Clifford Chance, supra note 7, at 16; Orrick,
Herrington & Sutcliffe, Private Equity Global Insights, Proposed Changes to the UK
Takeover
Code
(April,
2011)
http://www.orrick.com/Events-andPublications/Documents/3569.htm.
80 See Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 2.6 at D9-D10; Amendment
Instrument, supra note 37, at app. 12-14; Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 2.8 at D12D14; Amendment Instrument, supra note 37, at app. 16-18.
76

419

2013

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

2:2

publically identified and announced until that potential acquirer must:
1) announce a firm intention to make an offer in accordance with
Rule 2.7;81 or 2) announce that it does not intend to make an offer.
The latter situation then triggers Rule 2.8.82 Rule 2.8 bars, for six
months, any company that has announced that it will not make an
offer to a target from a number of activities, including: announcing
an offer or possible offer for the same target;83 acquiring any interest
in shares of the previous target or any irrevocable commitment for
those shares amounting to an aggregate of thirty-percent of the
voting rights of the target company;84 making any statement that may
raise or confirm the possibility that the bidder may make an offer to
the target company;85 or take any steps in connection with a possible
offer for the target.86 In other words, Rule 2.6 starts the twenty-eight
day countdown, at which point the potential bidder must comply
with Rule 2.7 and make a firm offer (the “Put Up” part), or walk
away for six months under Rule 2.8 (the “Shut Up” part).87
Rule 2.6 and its automatic invocation of Rule 2.8 will put time
constraints on bidders that were rarely seen before the amendments.88
This change reflects The Panel’s attempt to remedy the
aforementioned problems resulting from the “virtual bid.”89 Now
that the twenty-eight day deadline begins automatically upon an
Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 2.7(a) at D11-D12 (requiring an
offeror company to follow through on its firm intention to make an offer unless
another company makes a higher offer or some other limited exceptions occur).
82 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 2.6(a) at D9.
83 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 2.8(a) at D12-13.
84 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 2.8(b)-(c) at D12-D13.
85 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 2.8(d) at D12-D13.
86 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 2.8(e) at D12-D13.
87 See Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rules 2.6-2.8 at D9-D13.
88 See Put Up or Shut Up, supra note 68 (explaining that before the
amendments a 28 day Put Up or Shut Up deadline was imposed by The Panel only
after the target board asked for, and was granted one by The Panel, when they were
besieged without a firm offer having been made).
89 THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS CODE COMMITTEE,
REVIEW OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE REGULATION OF TAKEOVER BIDS:
RESPONSE STATEMENT BY THE CODE COMMITTEE OF THE PANEL FOLLOWING
THE
CONSULTATION ON PCP 2011/1, RS 2011/1 at 7, 12
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2008/11/RS201101.pdf [hereinafter Response Statement].
81
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announcement that starts an offer period, bidding companies will
want to keep their investigations into, or preparations for, an offer
secret for as long as possible.90 Bidding companies will likely shroud
their actions in secrecy to avoid having only twenty-eight days to
“Put Up or Shut Up” when they are not advanced enough in their
preparations to make an offer within that period.91
About two-thirds of respondents to the Consultation Paper
were actually opposed to the coupling of the all bidders identification
requirement and the mandatory “Put Up or Shut Up” deadline for
various reasons.92 The primary reason is because the mandatory “Put
Up or Shut Up” deadline may reduce competition for the acquisition
of target companies and thus possibly deny target shareholders the
benefit of other competing offers.93 Also, it may cause more
advanced potential bidders to “flush out” less advanced potential
bidders by leaking information that will require an announcement
and an identification of all potential bidders.94 The amendments may
otherwise create an “uneven playing field” where bidders that are
more advanced in their preparations will have a large advantage over
those not as advanced in their preparations.95 The Panel decided to
enact the amendments with little change despite having more
opposition than support.96
This is now due to the requirement that all bidders be named in an
announcement that opens an offer period from amended Rules 2.2 and 2.4(a).
91 See Client Briefing, Clifford Chance, supra note 7, at 11, 16; Orrick,
Herrington & Sutcliffe, supra note 79.
92 Response Statement, supra note 89, at 8.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. (showing that although listed as separate concerns, those
respondents who were opposed to the mandatory identification of all potential
bidders requirement were generally concerned about the “uneven playing field” that
could arise after an announcement that starts an offer period regardless of whether
it begins in the natural course of offer negotiations or because a well-advanced
bidding company is attempting to “flush out” the less well-advanced potential
bidders).
96 See id. at 9-11. Furthermore The Committee deemed that it would be
inappropriate to allow the Offeree company’s board to decide when they wanted to
keep a potential bidder’s identity secret because that would lead to potential bidders
requiring, as a pre-condition, a confidentiality agreement to keep their identity
concealed in almost every deal. Id.
90
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The Panel decided that it would review how the amendments
affected the M&A market one year after their implementation.97 The
one-year review was published in November of 2012.98 Although the
findings were generally positive, the report also stated that much of
the effects of the amendments remain to be seen.99 Multiple large
law firms predicted, just after The Panel announced that the
amendments would be adopted, that the identification of all potential
bidders requirement, and the mandatory twenty-eight day “Put Up or
Shut Up” deadline, would require bidders to use the utmost secrecy
when preparing a bid.100 Bidders would need to be much more
advanced in their preparations before making an approach to a target
company board of directors than a bidding company would be under
the pre-amendments Code.101 The Committee kept the narrow
exception that a target board could request an extension of the “Put
Up or Shut Up” deadline for some or all potential bidders in a
takeover.102 This exception will provide some relief for potential
bidders negotiating a friendly acquisition with the target company’s
board of directors.103 Hostile bidders, on the other hand, will need to
be wary of how they protect information regarding a potential
approach to a target.104 It is this heightened wariness that led some
commentators to conclude that the amendments will deter potential
bidders from ever making an offer in the first place and thereby harm

Response Statement, supra note 89, at 5.
Discussed infra Part III.
99 See generally THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS CODE
COMMITTEE, REVIEW OF THE 2011 AMENDMENTS TO THE TAKEOVER CODE,
2012/8,
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/2012-8.pdf
[hereinafter One Year Review].
100 Iain Wright, Publications, The UK Takeover Code: Significant Changes
Come Into Effect, MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS (Sept. 22, 2011),
https://www.morganlewis.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/publication.detail/publicati
onID/1f22a35e-c340-4de3-9703-2954b8020a98. See Client Briefing, Clifford
Chance, supra note 7, at 16; Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, supra note 79.
101 See Wright, supra note 100; Client Briefing, Clifford Chance, supra note
7, at 11, 16; Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, supra note 79.
102 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 2.6(c) at D9.
103 Wright, supra note 100, at 3.
104 See Wright, supra note 100, at 2.
97
98
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target shareholders by suppressing bid competition.105 The divisive
response of commentators, both before and after The Panel adopted
the amendments, shows that these two major amendments aimed at
correcting the “virtual bid” period remain the most controversial of
the amendments.106
C. The Prohibition of Deal Protection Measures
The Panel’s sweeping decision to prohibit deal protection
measures, except in limited circumstances,107 puts the United
Kingdom at odds with most other developed M&A markets.108 As
part of the amendments, The Code Committee entirely rewrote Rule
21.2.109 New Rule 21.2(a) prohibits the target company, or any
person acting in concert with the target company, from entering into
any offer related arrangements with a bidder.110 Furthermore, Rule
21.2(b) makes it clear that this prohibition includes inducement
fees111 of any amount.112 This is a significant change to U.K. M&A
practice where inducement fees of one-percent had become standard

105

See Response Statement, supra note 89, at 8; Patrone, supra note 5, at 77-

78.
See Wright, supra note 100, at 2.
The exceptions where the amendments still allow inducement fees are:
with a friendly or more preferred competing bid to a hostile bid (a “white knight”)
up to one-percent of the first “white knight” offer only payable if the hostile
competing bid is successful; if the target is in financial distress; or with a preferred
bidder up to one-percent of the bid in the event that the target has commenced a
formal auction sale. See Client Briefing, Clifford Chance, supra note 7, at 8, 12
(stating that most markets allow deal protection measures).
108 Id. (stating that most markets allow deal protection measures).
109 Response Statement, supra note 89, at 37.
110 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 21.2(a) at I16; Amendment Instrument,
supra note 37, at app. 32.
111 See generally Megan Murphy, Takeover Panel Set to Ban Break Fees, FIN.
TIMEs, Mar. 21, 2011, at 18; Break Fee, THE FREE DICTIONARY
http://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Break+Fee (“In mergers and
acquisitions, a fee the target pays to the acquirer in case a deal fails before
completion. Theoretically, this is done to reimburse the acquirer for due diligence
expenses, but, in practice, it is often used to attempt to restore good relations
between the two companies”).
112 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 21.2(b) at I16; Amendment Instrument,
supra note 37, at app. 32.
106
107
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in almost all acquisitions.113 By comparison, the Delaware Chancery
Courts have allowed inducement fees of three or three-and-a-half
percent.114 Although commentators agree that this sweeping ban will
alter what had become common practice, this modification was not
contested as much as the “virtual bid” correction amendments.115
The Panel’s Response Statement to their Consultation Paper
notes that only around one-third of respondents were opposed to the
amendments’ prohibition of inducement fees.116
Concerned
respondents suggested that prohibiting inducement fees would deter
potential bidders from making offers117 because the cost of preparing
and negotiating an offer may be prohibitive without some assurance
that the target will not leave a bidder at the altar.118 Similar to the
major concern with the “virtual bid” corrective amendments, the
major concern with the ban on inducement fees is that shareholders
may be harmed by not having the chance to decide on the merits of
all potential offers.119 In other words, some commentators are
concerned that the inducement fee ban will deter potential bidders,
reduce bid competition, and implicitly devalue the best offers that
could have been made to a target company.120
The Code Committee, however, concluded that this argument
cuts both ways, and that inducement fees possibly deter competing
bidders from making a topping offer.121 Competing bidders would be
deterred because they would have to offer at an extra high premium
See Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, supra note 79.
See e.g., McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 505 (Del. Ch.
2000) (3.5% break fee are not unreasonable); In re Pennaco Energy, Inc., 787 A.2d
691 (Del. Ch. 2001) (3% break fee and matching rights are not unreasonable).
115 See Response Statement, supra note 89, at 38 (“Around two-thirds of the
respondents who commented on the proposed general prohibition of offer-related
arrangements supported it or took a neutral stance”).
116 Response Statement, supra note 89, at 38.
117 Id.
118 See Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, supra note 79 (stating that costs
incurred in pre-offer activities such as due diligence and financing fees could be too
much of a burden for some potential offerors if there is no compensation for those
wasted costs if their bid is trumped).
119 Response Statement, supra note 89, at 38 (emphasis added).
120 Id.
121 Id. at 39.
113
114
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to make the deal worthwhile for the target company’s shareholders to
pay the inducement fee and accept the competing bid.122 With the
support of a majority of respondents, The Code Committee
implemented the amendment banning inducement fees because The
Panel believed that inducement fees had become so standard in
M&A transactions in the United Kingdom that targets were typically
not afforded a chance to negotiate over these fees.123 Consequently,
law firms predict that the inducement fee ban will have the biggest
impact on private equity firms, because private equity firms will
typically be in a more constrained financial position and will not want
to risk losing the money put into preparing a bid if their offer is
trumped by a competing offer.124 Strategic bidders125 will also be
concerned about the up-front costs of an offer after these
amendments, but the effects of the ban on inducement fees will likely
not be as drastic as with private equity firms.126
D. The Enhanced Disclosure Requirements
The final major change to the Takeover Code, the imposition
of enhanced disclosure requirements, consists of a series of small
changes aimed at increasing transparency during an acquisition.127
The most important new disclosures required by the Takeover Code
amendments are the revelation of advisor’s fees,128 bid financing129
and company financial information,130 and of the bidding company’s
intention with regard to the target company and the target company

Id.
See Wright, supra note 100, at 4.
124 See Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, supra note 79.
125 A Strategic Bidder is a company that is attempting to takeover another
company for the strategic purpose of enhancing its own value. For example, Kraft
taking over Cadbury to improve its market share in the confections market.
126 See Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, supra note 79.
127 See generally Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rules 23.2, 23.3, & 24 at J1-J16.
128 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 24.16 at J15-J16; Amendment
Instrument, supra note 37, at 45-46.
129 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 24.3(f) at J7; Amendment Instrument,
supra note 37, at 41.
130 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 24.3(a), (c) at J4, J5; Amendment
Instrument, supra note 37, at 37-39.
122
123
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employees.131 This section will briefly look at each of these major
disclosure requirements.
1. Disclosure of Advisor’s Fees
The idea behind disclosing advisory fees is that although the
fees may only make up a small percentage of the total transaction, an
advisory fee is still usually a significant amount of money, sometimes
rising as high as nine digits.132 With advisory fees being such a
significant amount of money, The Panel concluded that these fee
arrangements are material contracts to an offer.133 As such, the
shareholders deserve to know how the directors are spending
company money in relation to that offer, and disclosure of those fees
might reveal incentives for advisors attempting to persuade their
clients to a particular course of action.134
2. Disclosure of Financial Information and Financing Information
Before the amendments were implemented, disclosure of
financial information and information relating to the financing of an
offer was only required in securities exchange offers. 135 The
amendments now require disclosure of this information in all offers,
including cash-out mergers.136 A vast majority of respondents
supported this disclosure requirement, even though there would be
some small additional cost to bidders and targets in assembling this
information for dissemination, because it benefits shareholders far
beyond that added cost.137

Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 24.2 at J3; Amendment Instrument, supra
note 37, at 37.
132 Liam Vaughan, M&A: Costs Overlooked in the Heat of the Moment, FIN.
NEWS, Jan. 3, 2011, http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2011-01-03/m-and-acosts (explaining that investment banks can earn about one to one and one half
percent on deals over $1 Billion, commercial banks can earn considerably more for
financing an M&A deal, and legal fees can be as high as $10 Million).
133 Proposed Amendments, supra note 37, at 58.
134 Id.
135 Response Statement, supra note 89, at 67.
136 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 24.3(a)-(e) at J4-J7; Amendment
Instrument, supra note 37, at 37-40.
137 Response Statement, supra note 89, at 68.
131
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3. Disclosure of Future Intentions
The major new disclosure requirement that appears to be the
most reactionary to the Kraft-Cadbury takeover is the requirement to
disclose intentions138 regarding the target company and its
employees.139 Many British citizens were upset that Kraft announced
that it would close Cadbury’s Bristol factory, signaling the loss of 400
jobs, shortly after it promised to keep it open and spare all Cadbury
jobs in the United Kingdom.140 The amended Rule 24.2 requires that
successful bidding companies make known, among other things, their
intentions with regards to future employment of personnel and
management, and their strategic plans for the acquired company.141
If the successful bidder has no intention to make any changes, the
companies must disclose that as well.142 The respondents to the
Consultation Paper agreed wholeheartedly with this change.143 The
Code Committee conceded, though, that some hostile bidders might
not have undertaken enough due diligence to really know the exact
future plans of the company.144 In such cases, The Committee still
expects that the bidding company should disclose, to the full extent
possible, its business rationale for acquiring the target.145
The 2011 amendments to the United Kingdom’s City Code
on Mergers and Takeovers will certainly have an impact on the M&A
market and on M&A practice.146 The question now becomes
whether these amendments effectively protect target company
138 For example, The Code Committee now wants an acquiring company
to state if after the merger or takeover it will make any job cuts or close any offices
or factories. See Sarah Gadd, The Revised UK Takeover Code: Employment Considerations,
13 THE WORKING WORLD (Lantham & Watkins), Nov. 2011,
http://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/working-world-november-2011.
139 See id.
140 See e.g., Cadbury’s Bristol Plant to Close by 2011, BBC NEWS, Feb. 9, 2010,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8507066.stm.
141 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 24.2 at J3; Amendment Instrument, supra
note 37, at 36-37.
142 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 24.2 at J3; Amendment Instrument, supra
note 37, at 36-37. (Id.)
143 Response Statement, supra note 89, at 80.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 See Davidoff, supra note 9.
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shareholders from the recent perceived tactical advantage achieved by
bidding companies? And furthermore, do the amendments reach too
far or might they not reach far enough?
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE 2011 TAKEOVER AMENDMENTS
As the collective owners of a corporation shareholders stand
to gain or lose on their investment as the result of a merger or
acquisition.147
In public corporations, a large majority of
shareholders individually have only a miniscule vote and cannot
affect the policies of the corporation by voting their shares without
the cooperation of many other shareholders.148 In Delaware a
corporate board of directors is able to utilize a poison pill to block
their shareholders from selling their shares in a tender offer. 149 The
United Kingdom, however, has developed a vastly different approach
than the Delaware courts to protect shareholder interests in these
potential multi-billion pound (or dollar) transactions.150 The United
Kingdom takeover regulations have always upheld board neutrality in
a takeover situation, and The Code Committee did not compromise
that tenet with the 2011 amendments.151 However, some have argued
that abandoning the Board Neutrality Rule for more Delaware-like
defensive maneuvers would have better protected shareholders.152
See generally 18 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 630 (2011).
For example, as of the end of September 2011, ExxonMobil’s largest
shareholder was an institutional investor, The Vanguard Group, Inc. with 4.16% of
the vote, contrasting with their largest direct shareholder Rex Tillerson, who has
about 0.03% of the total vote. Exxon Mobil Corporation (XOM): Major Holders,
YAHOO! FIN. (Jan. 5, 2011 3:55 PM)
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/mh?s=xom+Major+Holders.
149 A poison pill, or shareholder’s rights plan, makes the shares so
unattractive to the potential acquirer that an offer will never actually be made to
shareholders, even if they desire the offer, without the board of directors first
redeeming the poison pill. See e.g., Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346,
1348-49 (Del. 1985).
150 See e.g., Han-Wei Liu, The Non-Frustration Rule of The U.K. City Code on
Takeovers and Mergers and Related Agency Problems: What are the Implications for the E.C.
Takeover Directive?, 17 COLUM. J. EUR. L. ONLINE 5, 8-9 (2011),
http://www.cjel.net/online/17_2-liu/ (illustrating briefly the difference in possible
board of director action under U.S. and U.K. takeover regulation regimes).
151 See Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 21.1(a) at I13.
152 See Patrone, supra note 5, at 85.
147
148
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This dichotomy between United Kingdom and United States
takeover regulation begs the question: do these takeover regulation
regimes protect shareholders equally and adequately? This part will
look at economic studies of defensive devices and how they affect
shareholder value, and will also explore how “short-term” investors
affect established long-term shareholders.
A. Economic Studies of the Impact of Defensive Maneuvers
Studying the economic effect of defensive maneuvers on
shareholders in takeover situations requires using data with numerous
variables.153 Different studies, focusing on different variables, have
thus led to opposing conclusions.154 The reality of the depth and
breadth of data and variables results in no one study that definitively
declares that shareholders benefit or suffer a loss when defensive
measures are utilized by a target company’s board of directors. 155 Yet
prominent Harvard M&A economist Lucian Bebchuk and some of
his understudies have exposed a trend that the entrenchment of a
board of directors156 negatively affects shareholder value.157 This is
particularly relevant to the 2011 United Kingdom Takeover Code
amendments because The Code Committee never questioned the
importance of the Board Neutrality Rule,158 which should continue to
prevent the possibility of board entrenchment.

153 See Michael D. Frakes, Classified Boards and Firm Value, 32 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 113, 115 (2007).
154 John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile
Takeovers, and Why? – The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation, 97
GEO. L. J. 1727, 1732 (2007).
155 See Frakes, supra note 153, at 114-15.
156 Board entrenchment refers to the phenomenon of a corporation’s
board of directors taking possibly self-serving action to maintain their positions as
directors of the company. In the United States, when a board appears to be
entrenching itself against shareholders’ wishes, a breach of fiduciary duty question
will likely arise. See generally Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del.
Ch. 1988).
157 See generally Frakes, supra note 153, at 114-15; Lucian A. Bebchuk, et
al., The Powerful Anti-Takeover Force of Staggered Boards, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887 (2002).
158 See generally Consultation Paper, supra note 4 (declaring The Committee’s
intention to make changes to The Code but never entertaining an amendment to
the Board Neutrality Rule). But see Patrone, supra note 5 (arguing that repealing the

429

2013

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

2:2

The Board Neutrality Rule in the United Kingdom prevents
much data about board entrenchment in the United Kingdom’s
companies from being accumulated.159 However, exploring the
effects of board entrenchment in United States companies resonates
with The Code Committee’s support of the Board Neutrality Rule
because the negative correlation of board entrenchment to
shareholder value supports The Committee’s decision to continually
maintain board neutrality.160 In 2002, Professor Bebchuk and
colleagues conducted an in-depth study of Delaware companies with
both poison pills and staggered boards161 that showed that the
combination of these defensive measures makes it almost impossible
for a bidding company to acquire a target company without consent
from the board of the target company.162
The empirical evidence from Professor Bebchuk’s study
suggests that staggered boards, combined with a poison pill, provide
the most robust takeover defense in Delaware corporate law.163
Furthermore, the research and statistical analysis shows that this
robust takeover defense164 does, in fact, lead to board
Board Neutrality Rule would better protect target shareholders instead of
protecting target companies).
159 See Nicholas F. Carline & Pradeep K. Yadav, Decoupling the Motives for
Takeover Resistance, and the Implications for Stockholders, Managers and Bidders 3-4 (August
2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with The University of Oklahoma),
http://www.ou.edu/content/dam/price/Finance/CFS/paper/pdf/SeminarPaper_
Carline.pdf.
160 See Bebchuk, supra note 157, at 937.
161 A staggered board of directors is a board that is split up into classes,
and only one class is up for election at each annual shareholders meeting. For
example, a company with a nine-director staggered board, in three classes, would
have only three directors up for election every year, with the winners of that
election serving three-year terms before they would be up for another election.
The staggered board thus prevents a change in control of a company’s shares from
changing control of the board of directors until at least two annual shareholder
meetings have passed, or in other words, at a minimum when just over one year has
elapsed. See Staggered Board, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 5, 2011, 12:35 PM),
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/staggered-board.asp#axzz1iYTZNDa8.
162 See Bebchuk, supra note 157, at 890.
163 Id. at 950.
164 In Delaware Corporate law the board of directors can unilaterally
impose a poison pill if they can meet the Unocal enhanced business judgment test ex
post in the Delaware courts. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d
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entrenchment.165 It also shows that board entrenchment negatively
affects shareholder value by an average of about 11.6% on their final
return on investment.166 This loss of wealth to the shareholders is
most likely due to the high odds that the target company will remain
independent.167 Shareholders will often be unable to dismantle a
staggered board or force the board to redeem a poison pill.168 The
shareholders are financially harmed by the resulting board
entrenchment and their inability to cash in on an acquisition
premium offered by the acquiring company for their shares. 169 This
is the exact type of effect that the Takeover Panel sought to avoid in
the United Kingdom with the Board Neutrality Rule.
Michael D. Frakes, a disciple of Bebchuk’s, further explored
how staggered boards affect firm value using three different statistical
analyses designed to correct for estimated co-variables.170 He also
found a negative correlation between staggered boards and

946, 955 (Del. 1985); Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del.
1985).
165 Bebchuk, supra note 157, at 913-14, 937 (providing an example of U.S.
Surgical’s hostile bid for Circon in 1996, where Circon was able to thwart U.S.
Surgical’s hostile takeover attempt with a poison pill and an effective staggered
board, only to end up selling itself two years later for 17% less than the original
bid).
166 Id.
(“As a starting point we examine total shareholder returns,
irrespective of bid outcome, for [Effective Staggered Board (ESB)] and non-ESB
targets. Shareholders in the ESB targets in our sample achieved 31.8% returns in
the nine months after a hostile bid was announced, compared to 43.4% returns for
the shareholders in non-ESB targets, representing an 11.6% difference.”).
167 Id. at 950 (“We find that the increased odds of remaining independent
are quite costly for target shareholders, without providing sufficient countervailing
benefits in terms of higher acquisition premium. We estimate than an ESB reduces
the expected return of target shareholders in the nine months after a hostile bid is
launched on the order of 8-10%. The negative wealth effect associated with ESBs
is particularly problematic from a policy perspective because the majority of
staggered boards were established before the judicial developments that gave them
their antitakeover potency.”).
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 See generally Frakes, supra note 153 (Frakes creates in-depth statistical
models and regression analyses to correct for variables and co-variables such as
other anti-takeover measures, firm size, firm value among others).
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shareholder value.171 The Frakes and Bebchuk studies suggest that
there could be added costs to target shareholders from how board
entrenchment may affect manager and director behavior, though the
studies specifically did not explore this aspect of staggered boards. 172
This suggestion, although still not conclusively proven, provides a
supplemental argument to the aforementioned return on investment
concerns when a board of directors is allowed to unilaterally enact
entrenching defensive measures.
As previously stated, these studies are not conclusive and
there are arguments that defensive measures actually increase
shareholder value.173 However, the argument that defensive measures
provide the board of directors a negotiating advantage to achieve
higher premiums for the shareholders in a hostile or friendly
takeover174 has largely been undermined by Harvard Professor of
Law and Business Guhan Subramanian.175 His research suggests that
the bargaining power hypothesis is only applicable in a narrow subset
of acquisitions.176 Professor Subramanian argues that takeover
See Id. at 150-51 (meaning that the more robust the defensive
mechanism employed by the board of director, the lower shareholder value would
tend to be).
172 See Frakes, supra note 153, at 114, 150; Bebchuk, supra note 157, at 939
(suggesting that when managers and directors are protected by defensive measures,
they may not act as efficiently as possible, or in the best interest of the
shareholders, because the directors know they cannot be ousted by discontent
shareholders).
173 See Frakes, supra note 153 (citing Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case Against
Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U CHI. L. REV. 973, 1011 (2002) (explaining
that some of the major arguments in favor of defensive measures by the board of
directors are: defensive measures allow management to avoid distractions and focus
on current operations; without defensive measures directors may focus excessively
on short-term results to the detriment of long-term value; and most importantly,
that defensive measures give management a bargaining power that allows them to
maximize the premium paid to shareholders in a hostile takeover)).
174 See generally Guhan Subramanian, Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover
Defenses, 113 YALE L. J. 621, 629-30 (2003).
175 See Subramanian, supra note 174, at 623.
176 . Id. (“I demonstrate that the bargaining power hypothesis only applies
unambiguously to negotiations in which there is a bilateral monopoly between
buyer and seller, no incremental costs to making a hostile bid, symmetric
information, and loyal sell-side agents. These conditions suggest that the
bargaining power hypothesis is only true in a subset of all deals, contrary to the
171

432

2013

Comment

2:2

defenses do not help a target company’s shareholders nearly to the
extent argued by the “bargaining power” proponents of defensive
measures, even in friendly, negotiated acquisitions.177
Although not dispositive, the above-mentioned legal
economists provide strong evidence that supports promoting the
neutrality of a target board of directors in a hostile takeover situation.
There remains, however, the problem The Code Committee faced on
how to address “short-term” investors in a takeover, while still
requiring the target board of directors to remain neutral.
B. Studies of the Effects of “Short-term” Investors
Modern financial market practices can lead to a distortion of
shareholder voting rights by decoupling those voting rights from an
economic interest in the company.178 This often happens through the
buying and selling of call options or put options on shares borrowed
from brokers, or using other forms of derivatives.179 In mergers and
acquisitions, voting disparity will arise in merger arbitrage,180 or
claim of some defense proponents that the hypothesis applies to all negotiated
acquisitions.”).
177 Id. at 684.
178 See TR Investors, LLC v. Genger, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 153, 70-71
(Del. Ch. July 23, 2010) (explaining how the voting rights and residual claims of
shares can be separated and thereby result in situations where a stock holder might
vote adversely to the interests of the company because their economic interests do
not align with shareholders who have a long-term, residual claim vested in their
shares) (citing Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L.
REV.775).
179 For discussions on the intricacies of methods of decoupling share
voting rights from share economic interests see Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy,
Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 775. See also Henry T. C. Hu and Bernard
Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S.
CAL. L. REV. 811 (2006).
180 Merger arbitrage is when an investor buys shares of the target
company after the announcement of a merger or tender offer. The investor hopes
to profit on the premium paid by the acquirer to the target shareholders over the
market price that the investor bought the shares after the announcement. The
major risk for this type of investment is if the companies fail to consummate the
transaction, the shares will likely be worth less than what the investor paid to
acquire them. See Merger Arbitrage, FUNDAMENTALFINANCE (Jan. 16, 2012, 5:49
PM),
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alternatively, when a shareholder has a negative economic interest181
arising when the investor short sells her shares.182
In the modern M&A marketplace, the most influential shortterm investors are typically hedge or mutual funds.183 Institutional
investors like mutual funds are, in practice, the only investors with
the resources to attain voting rights sufficient to affect the outcome
of a shareholder vote.184 There are recent examples of hedge funds
being able to use their voting power to block or alter acquisitions
from both the acquiring side and the target side.185 This institutional
investor activism is not always detrimental to the established
individual shareholders of these companies.186 However, the possible
decoupling of the economic interests from the voting rights in a
merger arbitrage situation poses serious complications with respect to
the established shareholders.187 This section will attempt to
http://www.fundamentalfinance.com/mergers-acquisitions/merger-arbitrage.php.
181 An investor might have a negative economic interest in a company
when he or she makes a profit if the share price declines. See Hu & Black, supra
note 179, at 832-34.
182 Short selling is when an investor borrows shares from their broker,
and sells those shares immediately. The investor is then required to “cover” those
borrowed shares by buying identical securities and giving them back to the broker.
The investor is attempting to profit by betting that the share price will fall between
when they sell the borrowed shares and when they have to “cover” those shares. A
price drop will give the investor a profit of the difference in price of the initially
sold shares and the bought back “covering” shares. If the price rises within that
time frame, however, the investor will realize a loss equal to that same difference.
See Brigitte Yuille, Short Selling: What is Short Selling?, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 16,
2012, 6:14 PM),
http://www.investopedia.com/university/shortselling/shortselling1.asp#axzz1jf8S
8DOx.
183 See Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law,
59 ALA. L. REV. 1385, 1442 (2008).
184 See supra note 148.
185 See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate
Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1034-36 (2007)
(explaining, how Deutsche Borse was forced to abandon its bid for the London
Stock Exchange because of its own dissatisfied hedge fund and mutual fund
shareholders).
186 Id. (explaining how Chiron institutional shareholders expressed
dissatisfaction with Novartis’ bid for Chiron and eventually forced Novartis’
premium paid up from 23% to 32%).
187 See infra Part III.B.1-2.
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summarize the major concerns regarding the disconnect between
voting rights and economic interests that have arisen over the last
two decades and how those concerns pertain to mergers and tender
offers. The following sections will discuss a typical merger arbitrage
situation, and the decoupling of votes and economic interests.
1. Merger Arbitrage Situations
It does not take a large inferential leap to realize that there
can be situations where merger arbitrageurs may be able to obtain the
votes to approve the sale of a target company, or to tender enough
target company shares, to force a transaction that may not maximize
value for established individual shareholders.188 A working paper by
Georgetown finance professor Lee Pinkowitz used statistical analysis
to highlight that companies with a large aggregate institutional
shareholder block are more likely to be targets of takeovers, and that
those takeovers are more likely to be successful.189 Pinkowitz’s
analysis revealed that institutional investors are important to the
takeover process because they either quickly tender their shares to the
bidder, or quickly sell their shares on the open market to merger
arbitrageurs.190 The study posits that the potential of these quick
sales make the target stock more liquid, and thus more likely to make
the acquisition successful.191
Likewise, Chancellor Chandler of the Delaware Chancery
Court recently noted in the Air Products case that the threat of merger
arbitrageurs tendering into an inadequate offer could be a legitimate
threat under the first prong of a Unocal test,192 “if the offer is indeed
For a prime example see Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16
A.3d 48, 109 (Del. Ch. 2011) (explaining that merger arbitrageurs tendering into an
inadequate offer may be a reasonable threat to a corporation).
189 Lee F. Pinkowitz, Monitoring by Transient Investors?
Institutions and
Corporate Control 21, 24 (unpublished manuscript) (on file at with Georgetown
University, McDonough School of Business),
http://faculty.msb.edu/lfp/Inst101800.pdf.
190 Id. at 24.
191 Id. at 28.
192 See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A. 2d 946, 955 (Del.
1985) (stating that for board defensive measures to fall under the protection of the
business judgment rule that the board must: 1) demonstrate that they had
reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness
188
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inadequate.”193 In this case, by the time the suit was filed, almost half
of the target company shareholders were merger arbitrageurs,194
which may demonstrate the prevalence and potential impact of
arbitrageurs on takeovers. While Air Products concedes that merger
arbitrageurs help complete acquisitive transactions, Chancellor
Chandler strongly derides the possible adverse impact of merger
arbitrageurs on target company shareholders in a takeover.195 As
Chancellor Chandler explained in one case:
[T]he bad [arbitrageurs] and hedge funds who bought
in, had obviously bought their shares from folks who
were glad to take the profits that came with market
prices generated by the Merger and Vector Capital’s
hint of a higher price. These folks, one can surmise,
had satisfied whatever long-term objective they had
for their investment in Inter-Tel.196
Merger arbitrageurs clearly have an impact on M&A
transactions in general, but there remains skepticism as to how much
arbitrageurs negatively affect shareholders of the target company.
Individual established shareholders still must choose to sell their
shares to the “short-term” investors in the first place, thereby
satisfying their own investing goals.
existed and 2) that their defensive measure in response was reasonable in
comparison to the threat posed).
193 Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A. 3d 48, 109 (Del. Ch.
2011) (explaining, however, that in this case there was no legitimate threat because
the offer was, in fact, adequate).
194 Id. (“The argument is premised on the fact that a large percentage
(almost half) of Airgas’s stockholders are merger arbitrageurs—many of whom
bought into the stock when Air Products first announced its interest in acquiring
Airgas, at a time when the stock was trading much lower than it is today—who
would be willing to tender into an inadequate offer because they stand to make a
significant return on their investment even if the offer grossly undervalues Airgas in
a sale.” In short, the risk is that a majority of Airgas’s stockholders will tender into
Air Products’ offer despite its inadequate price tag, leaving the minority “coerced”
into taking $70 as well).
195 Id. (“The defendants do not appear to have come to grips with the
fact that the arbs bought their shares from long-term stockholders who viewed the
increased market price generated by Air Products’ offer as a good time to sell”).
196 Id. at 109 n. 413 (citing Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Delaware), Inc., 929 A.2d
786, 815 (Del. Ch. 2007)).
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2. Problems with Decoupling Voting Rights and Economic Interests
Further compounding this institutional investor complex is
how derivatives197 can decouple the economic interest from the
voting rights of shares. Two examples can help to illustrate this
principle. First, imagine a proposed acquisition where a target
company institutional shareholder is strongly interested in
consummating a proposed stock for stock merger, only the
investment community and influential acquiring company
shareholders think it is a bad deal and begin to convince the acquiring
company to back away. The institutional shareholder then buys
almost 9.9% of the acquiring company stock, but immediately short
sells198 another 9.9%. This transaction gives the institutional
shareholder the 9.9% vote from the first stock purchase, but
completely removes any economic risk from that purchase because
the short sale will totally offset any gain or loss from the voting stock.
Therefore, the institutional shareholder has a block of shares to vote
for the transaction against the wishes of most of the acquiring
company shareholders, at no economic risk, and then benefits greatly
from its target company stock after it is sold at an acquisition
premium, to the acquiring company.199
A second example occurred in Hong Kong in early 2006
where a deal, of which most minority target shareholders approved,
was blocked by a hedge fund.200 The fund had borrowed target
197 Examples include, futures contracts, forward contracts, options and
swaps.
See Derivative, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 18, 2011, 1:35 PM),
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/derivative.asp#axzz1jqBsyPgK.
198 See supra note 182
199 This entire example is heavily based on the Mylan Laboratories offer
for King Pharmaceuticals, where Perry Hedge Fund acted much like the example
institutional investor. For an excellent review of this situation see Anish Monga,
Note, Using Derivatives to Manipulate the Market for Corporate Control, 12 STAN. J. L.
BUS. & FIN. 186, 196-97 (2006).
200 See Hu & Black, supra note 179, at 834-35 (“Henderson Land offered
to buy the 25% minority interest in Henderson Investment, a publicly held affiliate.
Most minority shareholders favored the buyout, and Henderson Investment’s share
price increased substantially. Under Hong Kong law, however, the buyout could be
blocked by a negative vote of 10% of the “free floating” shares—in this case about
2.5% of the outstanding shares. To everybody’s surprise, 2.7% of the shares were
voted against the buyout. Henderson Investments shares fell 17% the day after the
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company shares, and short sold them to make a profit off of the
collapsed deal when the target share price declined sharply after the
deal fell through.201 Other economic and voting decoupling
complications can arise in various contexts, including other merger
and acquisition situations.202 While many of the risks and pitfalls that
are pervasive throughout merger arbitrage stand out and beg to be
addressed by different takeover regimes, it remains unclear if target
company shareholders suffer due to these merger arbitrageurs. To
summarize, the Board Neutrality Rule appears to well protect
shareholders, while it remains far from conclusive that “short-term”
investors do, or do not have a negative impact on shareholders.
IV. WHY THE TAKEOVER CODE AMENDMENTS WILL WORK
The Code Committee may have gotten the 2011 Takeover
Code amendments just right. The staggering number of variables in
any regulation means that only time will tell if The Committee did, in
fact, hit a bull’s eye with these amendments, or if corrective changes
will be necessary sooner rather than later. This section will
hypothesize that the amendments will accomplish the goal of leveling
the playing field between targets and acquirers, all while continuing to
robustly protect shareholders, and not overreaching to the detriment
of other members of the M&A marketplace.
The Code Committee and the Takeover Panel set out to fix
the perceived imbalance of power in favor of acquiring companies
over target companies, and more importantly, the perceived adverse
effect of “short-term” investors.203 The amendments should help to
rectify this imbalance in a number of ways. First, the mandatory “Put

voting outcome was announced. It appears that . . . hedge funds borrowed
Henderson Investment shares before the record date, voted against the buyout, and
then sold those shares short, thus profiting from its private knowledge that the
buyout would be defeated”).
201 Id.
202 See generally Martin & Partnoy, supra note 179, at 788-92.
203 See supra Part I.

438

2013

Comment

2:2

Up or Shut Up” deadline should combat the “virtual bid” issues with
hostile takeovers in the United Kingdom.204
The mandatory “Put Up or Shut Up” deadline gives only a
limited window of four weeks for a potential bidder to make a firm
offer or walk away for six months.205 The amount of pressure to
blindly sell the target company applied to a company by merger
arbitrageurs should be partially alleviated by the limited window
imposed by this deadline.206 If a company can no longer besiege a
target,207 then this will decrease the likelihood that the composition of
the shareholders will have changed significantly through arbitrageurs
buying from established shareholders at small price increases.208
Smaller voting blocks of merger arbitrageurs means that there would
likely be more established target shareholders available to vote on the
merits of the offer as they see fit. Unlike in Air Products, where by the
time the suit was filed almost half of the shareholders were
arbitrageurs, the limited window and the Announcing All Bidders
requirement should prevent large scale arbitrage from taking place in
the takeover of United Kingdom public companies and should
protect the established shareholders of the target companies in the
original spirit of The Code.209 Although The Code forbids coercive
offers,210 the besieging of a target company was in a way coercive by
allowing arbitrageurs to erode target shareholder support. The “Put
Up or Shut Up” deadline should make great strides in rectifying the
erosion that results from the uncertainty of a protracted “virtual bid”
period; and the added secrecy and cost that may be placed on

See supra text accompanying notes 61-62.
See supra Part I.A-B.
206 These merger arbitrageurs will have likely bought target stock on the
open market after a slight increase in price due to the looming potential offer.
From that stock they would use their voting power to attempt to consummate the
transaction, and realize a gain on the acquisition premium paid by the acquirer.
207 Under the pre-amendment rules a company could besiege a target by
announcing that it is thinking about making a bid, while never actually making a bid
for months on end.
208 See supra note 195; see also supra text accompanying note 25.
209 See supra note 12.
210 See Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 9.1 at F1-F13 (requiring a bid to
all target shareholders if a bid is made for over 30% control, and requiring a best
offer, that the best offer made to any shareholder is made to all shareholders).
204
205
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acquiring companies is worth the benefits to the target
shareholders.211
The deal protection ban will likely have a small impact in
protecting shareholders, but to what extent remains to be seen. The
possibility exists that the inducement fee ban will actually decrease
the amount of acquiring companies that want to make an offer
because they will fear spending money on the preparation only to
lose out to a topping bidder.212 That may help the target company,213
but it may hurt the target company shareholders.214 However The
Code Committee left itself an out by requiring a review of the
amendments in September 2012.215 The Committee’s one year review
returned positive reviews of the amendments.216 The Committee
admitted that it was difficult to assess if any potential offerors have
been deterred by the amendments, however it does state that overall
bid activity remained at a similar level the year after the amendments
were enacted.217 The Committee also noted that the year after the
amendments saw none of the major concerns of the critics of the
amendments come to fruition.218 The general consensus of The
Committee was that in the first year, the Amendments successfully
curbed the problems of the “virtual bid” while not overly burdening
bidding companies.219
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.B.
213 It may help the target company to remain independent, and therefore
the target company board to keep their jobs, because the target will not receive any
bids at all. Or, it could help the target by allowing it to court a white knight
topping bid with a company that the board prefers, even if that company will not
offer a maximum bid.
214 It can hurt the shareholders, as Professor Bebchuk’s study showed, by
diminishing the return to the shareholders because the target company remains
independent. See supra note 167.
215 See Response Statement, supra note 89, at 5.
216 See generally One Year Review, supra note 99.
217 One Year Review, supra note 99, at 5.
218 For example, the Review noted that no instances of more wellprepared bidders “flushing out” less-prepared bidders were realized. Id. at 5-6. The
Review also stated that there was a significant reduction in an “offer period” being
commenced due to an untoward movement in share prices instead of because of a
firm offer. Id. at 6.
219 See One Year Review, supra note 99, at 5-10.
211
212
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As The Committee said in its Response Statement,
inducement fees as they were used in practice before the
amendments may just as well have hurt the target shareholders by
precluding any topping bids by competing bidders.220
The
Committee states in their One Year Review that they generally
consider the ban on deal protection measures a success.221 By not
making any earth shattering changes to the deal protections used in
the United Kingdom,222 and by allowing room to change any
detrimental effects of this ban, The Code Committee has provided a
very balanced approach to attempting to protect target shareholders
through the deal protection ban.
The enhanced disclosure requirements should substantially
help to provide target company shareholders with more crucial
information about the acquiring company’s financial outlook, its
intentions, and its stakeholders. The acquiring company will also
benefit from enhanced disclosures from the target company.223
These enhanced disclosures were strongly supported in the Response
Statement,224 and for good reason. Enhanced disclosure and better
information improves decision-making.
Furthermore, The
Committee reviewed the disclosure requirements in their one year
review and found that they improved transparency in offers.225
An easy argument for an American commentator to make
regarding the initial perceived imbalance favoring acquirers would be
to simply advocate for a target company’s board to be able to use
defensive measures like in Delaware.226 However, economic studies
show a trend that those very defensive measures can lead to

See Response Statement, supra note 89, at 39.
One Year Review, supra note 99, at 10-13. The Committee also noted,
though, that some bidders and targets still included some agreements that the
Committee Executive considered in violation of the amendments. Id. at 11.
222 Banning the deal protection measures is still only a decrease of 1% in
the size of the inducement fees. See supra text accompanying note 113.
223 See supra Part II.D.
224 See Response Statement, supra note 89, at 68, 80.
225 One Year Review, supra note 99, at 15-17.
226 See Patrone, supra note 5 at 85.
220
221
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significantly lower returns to the target shareholders.227 In light of
these studies by prominent economists, it is hard to imagine that
repealing the Board Neutrality Rule would not lead to occasional
situations that harm shareholder investments significantly. The
Takeover Panel should be applauded for remaining so steadfastly in
support of the Board Neutrality Rule as it embodies the shareholder
protection that is one of the main goals of The Code.228 Target
shareholders can rest assured that the board of directors will typically
be serving the shareholders’ best interest and not their own. The
target shareholders also should assume that they will get close to the
maximum merited premium on their shares, and thus the best return
on investment they could possibly receive in a given takeover
scenario.
The economic studies generally support keeping the target
board of directors neutral in a hostile takeover. But, The Code
Committee had to address the merger arbitrageurs and their influence
on bids in a measured fashion.229 The Committee achieved this in
intelligent fashion by enacting the deadline rules and ultimately
rejecting a proposal for more stringent regulation of “short-term”
investors.230 The Committee originally proposed, but later rejected, a
rule that would bar all investors who acquired shares in the target
after an announcement started a waiting period, from voting on the
merger or from tendering their shares.231
This proposal would have been too draconian of an approach
to regulating “short-term” investors. Law professors who have
written about the problems of decoupled voting rights and economic
interests in shares232 never mention an instance where merger
arbitrageurs bought target company shares only to severely harm the

See supra Part III.A (an average of 11.6% lower returns for
shareholders whose boards of directors were using entrenching defensive
mechanisms).
228 See Takeover Code, supra note 3, Introduction, ¶ 2(a) at A1.
229 See Response Statement, supra note 89, at 5.
230 Consultation Paper, supra note 4, at 20.
231 Id.
232 See generally Martin & Partnoy, supra note 179; Hu & Black supra note
179.
227
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target company through tendering into a totally inadequate offer.233
Like Chancellor Chandler noted in Air Products, arbitrageurs have to
buy their shares from long-term investors who must have felt content
with the return on their investment.234 To take away that option
would harm some target company long-term shareholders in
contravention of the principles of The Code.
If The Code Committee were to limit the voting rights for
“short-term” investors, there would likely be a noticeable decrease in
arbitrage activity. This would mean fewer opportunities for
established shareholders to sell their stock at the slight price increase
that will result from the potential offer.235
Stripping some
shareholders of the ability to gain from their investment to protect all
of the shareholders does not align itself with The Code principles,236
and The Code Committee made the right decision by ultimately
rejecting this proposal.
The Panel should not foreclose the proposed amendment to
disenfranchise “short-term” investors in its entirety. If, and only if,
during its mandatory annual review of the 2011 amendments, The
Panel decides that the amendments are not adequately correcting the
imbalance of power in favor of bidders, The Panel should consider
enacting this amendment on a limited basis. Instead of eliminating the
voting or acceptance rights of all investors who purchase target
company stock after the announcement of a potential bid, The Panel
should consider halving those “short-term” investors’ vote. This
could allow for more voting power to remain with established
shareholders, without reducing the value of the shares purchased
after the announcement of a potential offer to the same extent those
See supra Part III.B.2.
See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 109 n. 413
(citing Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Delaware), Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 815 (Del. Ch. 2007)).
235 For example, if Company A’s stock is trading at $20 per share, and
Company B offers to buy all of the stock of Company A at $30 per share, there will
be an immediate price increase upwards towards that $30 mark. It will not reach
$30 because there is the risk that the transaction will not happen, but the price
increase does provide an immediate opportunity to profit from an investment by
selling to a merger arbitrageur.
236 See Takeover Code, supra note 3, Introduction, Gen. Principles 1-6;
Takeover Code, supra note 3, Introduction, ¶ 2(a) at A1.
233
234
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This potential variation on the proposed amendment could
be further narrowed in scope by tying it to the Rule 8.3 disclosure
requirements.237 Rule 8.3 requires that any person who is or becomes
interested in 1% or more of the securities of any party to a
transaction, either before the announcement or during the offer
period, must disclose to the public their interest in any securities
relevant to the transaction as well as the details of any short positions
in any relevant securities to the transaction.238 If only those “shortterm” investors who have both over 1% interest and short positions
in opposing, relevant securities were to have their voting power
halved, then many of the problems associated with decoupling
economic interest and voting rights could be improved without
overly burdening established shareholders who want to sell their
shares to “short-term” investors. In other words, Rule 8.3 will make
it known which shareholders hold significant interests on both sides
of the transaction, and furthermore which have short positions which
decouple their economic interests and voting interests. Investors in
these situations will almost always be arbitrageurs. By halving the
vote of those arbitrageurs with significant voting power, established
shareholders will retain more power over the decision to accept the
bid, but this will not entirely preclude those long-term investors who
want to sell to arbitrageurs from doing so. This could result in a
“best of both worlds” situation that optimizes both established
shareholder protections and the liquidity of a company’s stock.
The Panel would have to undertake a consultation period and
another study to determine the feasibility of such a narrowly tailored
disenfranchisement amendment. It may not be possible to keep track
of, or distinguish, all of the shareholders who may be affected by this
variation of the proposed amendment, and so this proposed
amendment variation may ultimately be deemed impossible to
implement. However, The Panel should leave itself the option of

Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 8.3 at E21.
Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 8.3(a)-(b) at E21; Takeover Code, supra
note 3, Rule 8, note 5(a)(ii) at E27.
237
238
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exploring this possible amendment if the current amendments fail to
live up to their goals.
In sum, the United Kingdom’s 2011 Takeover Code
amendments were almost spot-on in their repairs of target
shareholder protections in hostile takeovers. The one year review has
returned positive results. The review supports the amendments and
conclude, that at least within the first year, the amendments have
protected target shareholders but not overreached to the point of
chilling the M&A market. The amendments as they were enacted will
continue protect target companies and target shareholders who are
under siege from a hostile bidder. The amendments will increase
shareholder access to information and allow them to choose the best
offer presented to them, or reject all offers, without being bearhugged into submission during the “virtual bid” period. A potential
incremental increase in shareholder protection may be able to be
achieved by exploring the possibility of limiting, but not totally
excluding, the voting rights of the few “short-term” investors who
also have short positions in a security relevant to the transaction.
Moreover, The Code Committee’s commitment to the Board
Neutrality Rule appears to be the strongest protection for established
target company shareholders that the Takeover Code can provide.239
Lastly, The Code Committee was smart in not committing to an
almost draconian measure that likely would have harmed target
shareholders as much or more than it would have protected them.
The measured response from The Panel may be remembered as a
great stride forward in modern M&A practice. Only time will tell.
CONCLUSION
The Kraft takeover of Cadbury flared tempers around the
United Kingdom. Although The Panel operated quickly, and in what
could have been viewed as a reactionary manner, its response to the
Kraft-Cadbury takeover will likely be remembered as a strong
improvement in the United Kingdom’s takeover regulation. The
Announcing All Bidders requirement and the mandatory twenty-eight
day “Put Up or Shut Up” deadline should do an excellent job of
addressing the pre-amendment problems with the “virtual bid.” The
239

See generally Part III.A.
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inducement fee ban could allow target company shareholders more
flexibility and freedom to entertain opposing or topping bids. The
enhanced disclosure requirements will increase information and aide
in the decision making of the shareholders as well as the companies
involved in a transaction. These amendments are designed to tilt the
balances of power back to a more equivalent position between
acquiring companies and target companies in hostile takeovers.
Furthermore, The Code Committee did not overreach when it
adopted these amendments and thus the amendments will not act as
too burdensome of a detriment to the mergers and acquisitions
market. Therefore, the 2011 Takeover Code amendments will likely
be successful in achieving their goals and protecting target
shareholders to an optimal extent.
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